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Glatt v. Fox Searchlight and the
Rhetorical Value of Inter-Circuit
Dialogue
By STEPHEN E. SMITH*

Introduction

L

EGAL READERS HAVE EXPECTATIONS for the writing we consume.
This is especially true of judicial writing, the opinions that take up so much
of our attention. We expect a certain format. We also expect rigorous
honesty, attention to detail, and other qualities.1 Among these expectations
is consideration of the state of the law, both within and without the
jurisdiction. We expect an opinion to manifest not only the bare act of lawmaking, but also sufficient attention to an issue’s context and history. We
expect the whole story.
As I read the Second Circuit’s opinion in Glatt v. Fox Searchlight, Inc.,2 I
was struck by its “say-so” approach to the resolution of a legal issue. Reading
it with the eyes of an experienced legal reader, but without much substantive
knowledge of the issues before the court, I thought it odd that the issues were
appearing with so little background to guide the court’s determination. The
case reads as though the topics it addresses have never come up before. Like
Athena springing from Zeus’s head, I was witnessing the test for determining
whether an individual is a properly unpaid intern, or an improperly unpaid
employee, spring from the panel’s pen.
I decided to investigate further, in order to discover whether the
intern/employee legal field was as barren as the opinion led me to believe.
After all, a court’s say-so may be all it has to work with. Perhaps I was
witnessing the best effort that could be made in the circumstances. It turns
out, however, that much was left on the table. The Second Circuit omitted

*
1.

Associate Clinical Professor of Law–Santa Clara University School of Law.
See generally Gerald Lebovits et. al., Ethical Judicial Opinion Writing, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 237, 238 (2008) (describing and analyzing requisites of form, substance, and ethics in
judicial opinion writing).
2. 791 F.3d 376 (2d Cir. 2015).
479
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significant extra-circuit authority on multiple issues.3
While there is no ethical requirement for courts to canvass their sister
circuits for support and disagreement with their positions, a court can
construct a more convincing argument by incorporating the history of the
issues before it. Providing a provenance to ideas can both bolster them and
demonstrate good faith in attempts to resolve them. Without a complete legal
context, an experienced legal reader may be suspicious of the legitimacy of
the claims. This Essay is agnostic on the correctness of the outcome in Glatt.
Rather, it opines on a part of the process by which that outcome was reached.

I.

Judicial Opinions, Norms of Completeness, and the
Persuasive Power of Including Previous Authority

The Federal Judicial Council describes judicial opinions as serving three
functions: (1) to “communicate a court’s conclusions and the reasons for
them,” (2) to “announce the law,” and (3) to “impose[] intellectual discipline
on the author, requiring the judge to clarify his or her reasoning and assess
the sufficiency of precedential support.”4
The functions of providing reasons and clarifying reasoning emphasize
adequate justification. “[O]ne of the purposes of an opinion is to legitimate
courts’ decisions.”5 A reasoned opinion “assures the public that the decision
is the product of reasoned judgment and thoughtful analysis, rather than an
arbitrary exercise of judicial authority.”6
As a result, there is a persuasive aspect to opinion writing. Beyond the
“announcement of the law,” a court’s opinion tries to earn the adherence of
those to whom it is addressed, primarily, other judges and lawyers.7 “The
judge’s goal is to motivate the reader to agree with the opinion and to give
the reader grounds to do so.”8
There are almost no limits on the contents of the opinion of a federal
circuit court. Of course, one obvious limitation is that at least two judges
must agree on its outcome. Beyond that, there are few rules. In fact, an
opinion may be omitted entirely with a summary disposition simply
concluding a matter.9 The existence of a Supreme Court that may correct a
3. See infra Parts II.B, II.D.
4. Judicial Writing Manual: A Pocket Guide for Judges, FED. JUDICIAL CTR. 1 (2013),
http://www2.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2014/Judicial-Writing-Manual-2D-FJC-2013.pdf.
5. Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Function, 96 GEO. L.J.
1283, 1317 (2008).
6. Lebovits, supra note 1, at 244.
7. Id. at 246 (“[A]ppellate opinions are mostly directed at lawyers and judges.”).
8. Id. at 286.
9. See,
e.g.,
9th
CIR.
R.
3–6,
available
at
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ruling later is a minimal restraint. Accordingly, a court may range relatively
freely, from jest, to verse, to glibness. It is commonplace, however, that a
circuit court need not follow previous dictates of sister circuits.10
Judicial freedom does not mean there are not professional norms for
opinions and reader expectations arising out of those norms. Those norms
include considering previous discussions of the matter under review.11 It is
standard practice for a court to examine precedents, including those from
outside the jurisdiction.12 Readers expect analogies to be made and
distinctions to be drawn in comparisons to pertinent authority.13 Precedents,
of any sort, may provide guidance for determining the outcome of the present
case. The considered judgments of other judges are—it should be too obvious
to say—the very basis of common law development. A prior case is part of
the prior art of decision making. An earlier case may, of course, be the root
of a new decision. Or, if it is poorly rendered, it may give rise to a betterreasoned resolution, either supporting or contradicting the outcome of the
previous case. Different cases, with different judges and different facts, serve
to add perspective. The common law develops in dialogue.14
The need to participate in this dialogue is especially true in an area of
law a court has not previously examined. The Federal Judicial Center advises
judges that “[i]f an opinion breaks new ground . . . the court should marshal
existing authority and analyze the evolution of the law sufficiently to support

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/uploads/rules
/rules.htm#pID0E0Q2B0HA.
10. United States v. Williams, 184 F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 1999) (“While we carefully and
respectfully consider the opinions of our sister circuits, we are not bound by them.”).
11. Lebovits, supra note 1, at 285 (“[A]ll opinions should contain the sources from which the
principle is derived.”); see also Oldfather, supra note 5, at 1334 (“[W]e expect courts to tell us why a
given result is correct and to do so with reference to appropriate legal materials.”).
12. United States v. Washington, 584 F.3d 693, 698 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[T]his court routinely
looks to our sister circuits for guidance when we encounter a legal question that we have not
previously passed upon.”); Hall v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 367 F.3d 1255, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004)
(“For direction, we consider the decisions of our sister circuits.”); Aldens, Inc. v. Miller, 610 F.2d
538, 541 (8th Cir. 1979) (“Although we are not bound by another circuit’s decision, we adhere to
the policy that a sister circuit’s reasoned decision deserves great weight and precedential value.”).
13. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933) (“It is then the function of a court to . . .
summon[] to its aid all the distinctions and analogies that are the tools of the judicial process.”).
The use of comparisons goes back to rhetoric’s beginning; see Aristotle, Rhetoric Book II, in POETICS
AND RHETORIC, ch. 20, 335 (W. Rhys Roberts trans., Barnes & Noble Classics 2005) (originally
published 4th Century BCE) (“We will first treat of argument by Example, for it has the nature of
induction,
which
is
the
foundation
of
reasoning.”),
available
at
http://rhetoric.eserver.org/aristotle/twoindex.html.
14. Lebovits, supra note 1, at 245 (“Opinion writing helps judges structure their decisions as
dialogues that consider the common law’s past and future.”).
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the new rule.”15 Lawyers know that they not only “should,” they will.16 The
expectation is of more than simple acknowledgment. Many courts describe
an obligation to consider, and even give some degree of weight, to sister
circuit determinations on similar issues.17 A Ninth Circuit case, Hart v.
Massanari,18 goes so far as to write that “common law responsibilities” require
“earlier authority [to be] acknowledged and considered,” and that it is “bad
form to ignore contrary authority by failing even to acknowledge its
existence.”19
With this background knowledge, held by every lawyer, it is jarring to
encounter an opinion lacking these references. It is even more jarring to
discover that they were available to the court, but forgone.
By participating in dialogue with earlier cases, a judge demonstrates two
related things. First, that the judge is rendering a decision based on complete
information. It is unusual to see a decision—especially on an issue of first, or
early, impression—without reference to the work of other courts. Review of
previous negative and positive authority relieves the reader’s fear that the
outcome was uninformed.
Second, engaging in dialogue with prior cases demonstrates that the
judge is acting in good faith. By acknowledging other negative authority, it is
clear that the judge is not trying to avoid challenges. It shows consideration
of both sides. By addressing prior positive authority, the judge acknowledges
that she is not operating on a blank slate, but is, in fact, a part of the dialogue,
owing credit to other interlocutors. Conversely, a “lack of candor, when
discovered, reveals a lack of integrity.”20

15. Judicial Writing Manual: A Pocket Guide for Judges,supra note 4, at 18; see also id. at 6 “[W]hen
the decision involves novel issues or a developing area of law, it is appropriate to trace the prior
development of the law and develop the legal and policy rationale at some length.”); id. at 4 (“When,
however, an opinion enters less developed areas of the law, laying down a new rule or modifying
an old one, . . . [the writer] should discuss and analyze the precedents in the area.”).
16. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1169 (9th Cir. 2001) (“When ruling on a novel issue
of law, [courts] will generally consider how other courts have ruled on the same issue. This
consideration will not be limited to courts at the same or higher level, or even to courts within the
same system of sovereignty.”).
17. Am. Med. Int’l, Inc. v. Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 677 F.2d 118, 123 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (“When cases presenting legal questions with national implications have arisen, this court has
always considered itself obligated to subject the analyses of coordinate tribunals to close scrutiny,
with the aim of producing a sound and well-reasoned decision.”); Washington Energy Co. v. United
States, 94 F.3d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“We thus temper the independence of the analysis in
which we engage by according great weight to the decisions of the other circuits on the same
question.”).
18. 266 F.3d 1155, 1170 (9th Cir. 2001).
19. Id.
20. Lebovits, supra note 1, at 293; see also Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor,
73 TEX. L. REV. 1307, 1321 (1995) (Candor may be defined as “full disclosure of relevant
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By recognizing the existence and operation of other supportive cases, a
court benefits from the legitimating effect of being part of a larger body of
law.21 Indeed, it is a common belief that “the primary source of judicial
legitimacy lies in reasoned appeals to appropriate legal authority.”22 The
existence of other supportive cases tends to demonstrate correctness.23
Reference to prior cases can demonstrate consistency, a valuable currency in
the world of law—how often are cases criticized as “outliers”?24 It seems odd,
then, to write a decision that does not embrace its fellows. It is rhetorically
valuable for a decision to be able to say, “this is part of the mainstream of
legal thought.”25

II. Glatt v. Fox Searchlight
Glatt is a Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) case brought by unpaid
interns, seeking their classification as “employees” under the FLSA, with the
minimum wage and overtime pay that status bestows. Memorably, two of
the plaintiffs had worked as interns on the film Black Swan.26 One intern’s
tasks included “purchas[ing] a non‐allergenic pillow for Director Darren
Aronofsky.”27
The trial court, among other orders, granted partial summary judgment
in favor of the plaintiff interns on the “employee” issue.28 It reached the
conclusion that they were statutory employees by applying a six-part test
published by the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division in its Field
Operations Handbook.29

information, evaluated subjectively from the judge’s point of view.”).
21. Lebovits, supra note 1, at 264 (“[T]he authority an opinion cites bolsters its legitimacy);
see also Chad Flanders, Toward a Theory of Persuasive Authority, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 55, 77 (2009) (“A
consensus among other circuits on a relevantly similar matter is, as a matter of practice, entitled to
some weight. The mere fact that other circuit courts have decided a matter one way is relevant. It
exerts a pull towards that result—not an inexorable pull, but a pull nonetheless.”).
22. Oldfather, supra note 5, at 1334.
23. See Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931, 1951 (2008) (“The
author of a brief or opinion who uses support to deny genuine novelty is asking the reader to take
the supported proposition as being at least slightly more plausible because it has been said before
than had it not been.”); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV.
131, 143 (2006) (a majority view may be “probative of what is right.”).
24. See, e.g., Hill v. Freedman Anselmo Lindberg, LLC, No. 14-C-10004, at 3 (N.D. Ill. May
1, 2015) (“Blakemore is a single outlier in a wave of district court opinions.”).
25. See In re Greene, 33 B.R. 1007, 1009 (D.R.I. 1983) (Selya, J.) (criticizing cases because
they “are alien to the mainstream of judicial thought and must be regarded skeptically”).
26. Glatt, 791 F.3d at 379–80.
27. Id. at 380.
28. Id. at 379.
29. Id. at 382.
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The Second Circuit held that the wrong analysis had been applied.30 It
first determined that the Department of Labor’s test was not due deference.
It then concluded that a balancing test should be applied to determine the
“primary beneficiary” of the relationship between the parties. It did not
decide where the plaintiffs were interns or employees, but remanded that for
assessment.31

A. Glatt on Deference to the Wage and Hour Division’s Field
Operations Handbook
As part of its opinion, the Second Circuit had to determine whether it
was bound under deference principles by the interpretive advice of the
Department of Labor (“DOL”). The DOL’s Wage and Hour Division
publishes an intern fact sheet that was issued in 2010 (“the DOL test”).32 The
Fact Sheet’s pedigree was considerably longer, however—the same language
and test for determining whether an individual was an unpaid “trainee”
(perhaps slightly different from an “intern”) or employee first appeared in the
Field Operations Handbook in 1967.33
The six-part test contained in the Handbook and Fact Sheet was
derived from a Supreme Court case, Walling v. Portland Terminal Co.34 In that
case, the Court concluded that certain railroad trainees were not
“employees” for purposes of the FLSA.35 The Second Circuit concluded it
was not bound to apply the DOL test.36 It first noted that only Skidmore37
deference could possibly apply.38 Unlike the better-known Chevron39
deference, Skidmore requires courts defer to administrative interpretations of
ambiguous statutes only to the extent of their “power to persuade.”40 Skidmore
deference gives courts a great deal of leeway to reject an agency’s
interpretation.41
30. Id. at 383.
31. Id. The court also addressed class certification, but because that part of the court’s
decision seems less pertinent to the thesis of this Essay, it is omitted.
32. Fact Sheet #71: Internship Programs Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION (2010), http:// www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs71.pdf
[hereinafter Fact Sheet #71].
33. Glatt, 791 F.3d at 382.
34. Id. at 383 (citing Walling v. Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. 148 (1947)).
35. Walling v. Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. 148, 153 (1947)).
36. Glatt, 791 F.3d at 383.
37. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
38. Glatt, 791 F.3d at 383.
39. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
40. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
41. See Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the Architecture of Chevron, 42
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The Second Circuit then provided two reasons it was not persuaded to
apply the DOL’s six-part test. First, “[b]ecause the DOL test attempts to fit
Portland Terminal’s particular facts to all workplaces,” and second, “because
the test is too rigid for our precedent to withstand.”42
In the course of holding that it was not persuaded by the DOL
interpretation, the Second Circuit cited three cases, none of which
specifically address the deference a court should accord the DOL test. The
first, Skidmore, simply establishes the premise—that deference is due if the
agency interpretation is persuasive.43 The second, Velez v. Sanchez,44 addresses
the substance of the issue, noting that “employee” determinations are
factorial inquiries, relying on the totality of the circumstances, but does not
address this DOL interpretation.45 Finally, a third case, New York v. Shalala,46
also addresses a separate issue—deference to an agency’s interpretation of a
judicial opinion.

B. What Glatt Omits from its Deference Discussion
To read Glatt, you would think no court had ever passed on the words
of the DOL’s six-part test. You would think it operated on a blank slate. It
did not. There is, in fact, not only a relatively robust jurisprudence on the
question, there is also what might be considered a circuit split.
Coming down on the side of deferring to the DOL test is Atkins v. General
Motors Corp.,47 which states, “[w]e recently cited these criteria with
approval . . . and the Administrator’s interpretation is entitled to substantial
deference by this court.”48 Similarly, Kaplan v. Code Blue Billing & Coding, Inc.,49
concluded that it may “properly resort for guidance” to the test.50 On the
other side of the deference ledger is McLaughlin v. Ensley51, which disclaims
the DOL test, though without mentioning the deference doctrine in coming
to its conclusion. Somewhere in the middle lies Reich v. Parker Fire Protection

WM. & MARY L. REV. 1105, 1118 (2001) (“Without a doubt, however, Skidmore affords less
deference than Chevron.”).
42. Glatt, 791 F.3d at 383.
43. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 (cited in Glatt, 791 F.3d at 383).
44. 693 F.3d 308, 330 (2d Cir. 2012).
45. Velez, 693 F.3d 308 (cited in Glatt, 791 F.3d at 383).
46. 119 F.3d 175, 180 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoted in Glatt, 791 F.3d at 383).
47. 701 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1983).
48. Id. at 1128 (citations omitted).
49. 504 F. App’x 831 (11th Cir. 2013).
50. Id. at 834–35.
51. 877 F. 2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1989).
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District,52 a case that quotes the DOL test verbatim and discusses at length
the question of the deference due that test, before concluding that the factors
“are relevant but not conclusive.”
None of these cases appear in Glatt. It is hard to believe, however, that
they were simply missed by law clerks in the course of their research. A case
cited in passing elsewhere in Glatt, Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & School, Inc.,
53 itself collects most of the authority on whether the DOL guidance deserves
deference.

C. Glatt on the Intern/Employee Distinction
After the court declined to defer to the DOL’s test, it went on to hold
that “the proper question is whether the intern or the employer is the primary
beneficiary of the relationship, and we propose the above list of non‐
exhaustive factors to aid courts in answering that question.”54 It asserted this
“primary beneficiary” test, again, as though it were of the court’s own
making.55
In reaching its decision, the court cites to two intra-circuit cases
addressing the existence of an employment relationship, but neither is an
intern/trainee case. The first, Velez v. Sanchez, called on the court to
“determine the ‘economic reality’ in a domestic service context.”56 The
second, Brock v. Superior Care, Inc., addressed the well-trod legal landscape of
the independent contractor versus employee inquiry.57 Both are certainly
pertinent, and worth discussion in the course of a case arising within the same
circuit, but neither engages in anything like an assessment of the “primary
beneficiary” of the individual/employer relationship.

D. What Glatt Omits from Its Intern/Employee Discussion
As in its deference discussion, Glatt’s substantive analysis of the
intern/employee distinction omits relevant extra-circuit authority. From the
text of the court’s decision, it appears that its “primary beneficiary test” is a
creature entirely of its own making, perhaps inspired by the imaginative
lawyers for the defendants.
Other courts, however, have proposed and applied a similar test. Glatt
is not a rugged individual, elbowing its way into the Federal Reporter. The

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

992 F. 2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1993).
642 F.3d 518 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoted in Glatt, 791 F.3d at 385).
Glatt, 791 F.3d at 385.
Id. at 383.
693 F.3d 308, 327 (2d Cir. 2012) (cited in Glatt, 791 F.3d at 384).
840 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1988) (cited in Glatt, 791 F.3d at 384).
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first case to apply this test was McLaughlin v. Ensley.58 It announced a test that
evaluates “whether the employee or the employer is the primary beneficiary
of the trainees’ labor.”59
The second case to explicitly apply a “primary beneficiary” test is the
Sixth Circuit’s Solis decision.60 Glatt cites Solis to support the proposition that
the appropriate test is a balancing test that considers factors, but does not
require a particular showing on any of them, rather than a test that requires
that a number of elements all be satisfied.61 It does not cite Solis, however, as
a source of the precise test it announces—a “primary beneficiary” test.
Besides these two sister circuit opinions, both directly on point, Glatt
omits other pertinent information engaging the concept of “primary
beneficiary.” The inquiry into the “primary beneficiary” of an individual’s
labor arises in other areas of employment law, including the “borrowed
servant” rule of vicarious liability,62 and the question of wage credits for
housing provided to migrant workers.63
Moreover, at least one commenter has opined on the propriety of the
test.64 While it seems far more discretionary to engage secondary sources
touching on the issue than the decisions of other circuits, when a secondary
source directly addresses the issue, it seems worth the minimal effort of
noting. Indeed, a plausible counter to the application of a primary benefit
test is provided in that article.65

III. Glatt’s Omissions Fall Short of Reader Expectations
There is too much law on the issues Glatt addresses for the court to

58. 877 F.2d 1207, 1209 (4th Cir. 1989). McLaughlin also addressed the deference issue.
59. Id.
60. Solis, 642 F.3d at 518.
61. Glatt, 791 F.3d at 385 (citing Solis).
62. Green v. United States, 709 F.2d 1158, 1163 (7th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he evidence simply
does not support the conclusion that his work—however narrowly defined—was of primary benefit
to CVSA.”).
63. Ramos-Barrientos v. Bland, 661 F.3d 587, 596 (11th Cir. 2011) (“employer may not
receive wage credits . . . because this expense primarily benefits the employer.”).
64. Stephen A. Mazurak, The Unpaid Intern: Liability for the Uninformed Employer, 29 ABA J. LAB.
& EMP. L. 101, 116–17 (2013).
65. Id. at 116–17 (“But in most of those cases, the employer also benefits by having a
particular job performed, maybe not at the level of proficiency that a skilled employee would impart
but still at a level that generates a profit for the employer. In most cases, balancing the benefit to
the individual and the benefit to the employer will not solve the problem since each will receive
some benefit.”). Additionally, a recent student note describes two approaches to the intern
determination—”primary beneficiary,” and “totality of the circumstances.”; Cody Elyse
Brookhouser, Whaling on Walling: A Uniform Approach to Determining Whether Interns Are “Employees” Under
the Fair Labor Standards Act, 100 IOWA L. REV. 751, 756 (2015).
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ignore. It appears disingenuous to draft an opinion that leaves out prior
thinking on an issue, both positive and negative. There is no question
whether the Second Circuit may come to its own conclusion on any issue
before it. It is unusual, however, for it to ignore previous conclusions on those
very issues.
On the deference question, at least four cases had previously addressed
the precise issue before it.66 Using these cases, the Glatt court could find
support for its conclusion, or find inadequacies in the reasoning of decisions
coming to a different conclusion. This sort of comparing and contrasting is
standard practice. At the very least, readers expect the court to acknowledge
the prior art on the subject. A complete decision tests its conclusions against
those that have come before. It does not simply omit those earlier
conclusions. A court’s acknowledgement that it is joining a greater battle
creates credibility. It demonstrates both good faith and the possession of
complete background information.
The failure to acknowledge the provenance of the “primary
beneficiary” test is another failure of completeness. To present an idea as
your own, without placing it in greater context, is odd to begin with, but
especially so given the obvious rhetorical benefits of providing that context.
Telling readers that you are adding to a body of existing law makes your
lawmaking act unremarkable, standard, and obvious. It is better for the
court’s legitimacy to be joining a doctrinal movement rather than presenting
itself as inventing one out of whole cloth, especially while tossing to the wind
the cloth of the DOL test. There is no upside to ignoring bolstering decisions.
When a reader comes upon a legal analysis without context, the reader
simply assumes an isolated decision is being made. It may or may not be the
correct decision, so far as the reader knows, but there is no concern that
something is being hidden. Failing to engage the larger discussion misleads
the reader into believing that a court has little to work with. This
inappropriately adds to the opinion’s authority—it presents itself as an
original attempt to resolve a unique problem. When there is a greater body
of law on the issue that the court has ignored, the reader is misled.
Of course, there is value in conciseness as well. It makes sense in many
cases to “abjure rote recitations of established legal principles [and] forgo
superfluous citations.”67 In a case like Glatt, however, faced with novel
principles, this value seems less compelling.
A reader who perceives an absence of authority may be left with an
intuition or perception of incompleteness—”this seems like an area of law

66.
67.

See supra notes 48–54 and accompanying text.
Bruce M. Selya, In Search of Less, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1279 (1996).
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that should have some forerunners.” When this intuition is confirmed,
however, a sense of disappointment replaces it.68 The reader may wonder
why the court pretends there are no signposts to guide it. The trust between
reader and writer is violated when expectations of inter-circuit dialogue are
undermined.

68. As one circuit judge wrote: “I would be less than candid if I failed to express my
disappointment that, except for a passing reference by Chief Judge Feinberg, the concurring
opinions of my colleagues never address, or even acknowledge, directly pertinent cases from our
sister circuits which reach contrary results on the precise issues considered here. We are, of course,
free to go our own way. But it would seem to me that the considered views of other circuits are at
least entitled to our respectful consideration.” United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1418 (2d
Cir. 1988), rev’d, 491 U.S. 600 (1989).

